Indiana Law Journal
Volume 90

Issue 1

Article 10

Winter 2015

The Rising None: Marsh, Galloway, and the End of Legislative
Prayer
Nicholas C. Roberts
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, robertnc@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Roberts, Nicholas C. (2015) "The Rising None: Marsh, Galloway, and the End of Legislative Prayer," Indiana
Law Journal: Vol. 90 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol90/iss1/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The Rising None: Marsh, Galloway, and the
End of Legislative Prayer
NICHOLAS C. ROBERTS*
INTRODUCTION
You know that every session of Congress begins with a prayer by a paid
pastor or paid minister whose salary has been paid by the taxpayer since 1777.
So lest we forget, this is not a new idea, and despite the objections of some,
they are in the minority and they are ignorant of the history of our country. So
humbly, I’d like to thank you for letting me pray and if out of respect to God
you’re open to bowing, I would love to pray.
....
So again, just govern this entire meeting, help it to be pleasing and effective,
and we ask all this in Jesus Christ’s name. Amen.1

In Town of Greece v. Galloway,2 which concerned a New York town’s practice
of opening its public board meetings with brief prayers, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the preceding prayer and others like it.3 The decision made
it clear that very few, if any, legislative prayer practices will be held
unconstitutional4 under the Establishment Clause.5 What remains unclear is how
that ruling can possibly coexist with earlier Supreme Court pronouncements that
the government must remain neutral in religious matters,6 and that the government
cannot favor religion over nonreligion.7

* Executive Notes & Comments Editor, Indiana Law Journal; J.D. candidate, 2015,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law; M.A., 2009, Syracuse University S.I. Newhouse
School of Public Communications; B.A., 2007, University of Southern California. I am
deeply grateful to my fellow ILJ editors for their help with this Note, to Professor Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer for his guidance and advice, and to S.J. Velasquez for pointing me toward
research on the Nones. I dedicate this to Katie Roberts, who was a constant source of love
and support, and who listened to me talk about this subject at great length—and rarely
complained. The views expressed in this Note are those of the author alone.
1. Complaint at ¶ 67, Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195 (W.D.N.Y.
2010) (No. 6:08CV06088), 2008 WL 7318228 (quoting the opening prayer delivered by
Pastor Vince de Paola at the October 16, 2007, meeting of the town board of Greece, New
York), rev’d, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
2. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
3. Id. at 1828 (“The town of Greece does not violate the First Amendment by opening
its meetings with prayer that comports with our tradition and does not coerce participation by
nonadherents.”).
4. Id. at 1824 (“Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or
betray an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a
prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation.”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
6. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).
7. Id. at 104 (“The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”).
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Before Galloway, the Supreme Court directly addressed the topic of legislative
prayer only once. In the landmark case of Marsh v. Chambers,8 the Court rejected a
challenge to the Nebraska state legislature’s practice of beginning its sessions with
prayers delivered by a chaplain—a Presbyterian minister employed by the State and
paid out of public funds.9 The Court held that where the chaplain’s appointment did
not “stem[] from an impermissible motive”10 and there was “no indication that the
prayer opportunity ha[d] been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to
disparage any other, faith or belief,” there was no Establishment Clause violation.11
The Court based its decision primarily on the long history of legislative prayer in
the United States.12
The Supreme Court did not revisit the issue of legislative prayer for thirty years
following Marsh. In the intervening years, lower courts struggled to apply its
holding, with inconsistent results.13 Unresolved questions included whether Marsh
required legislative prayers to be nonsectarian and what constituted an
impermissible motive in selecting a prayer giver. Galloway answered some of
Marsh’s questions, but raised others about the future of legislative prayer and about
the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause in general.14
This Note contends that the Supreme Court wrongly decided both Marsh and
Galloway. The Justices in the Court’s conservative majority likely voted for the
outcome they desired in Galloway, but even if the Justices had preferred a different
result, external pressures on the Court ensured that they would not overrule
Marsh.15 Although legislative prayer is safe for now, it will almost certainly be
ruled unconstitutional eventually. Marsh and its progeny depend on the exclusion
and marginalization of certain religious minorities, including polytheists and
atheists.16 Any legislative prayer offered to a monotheistic God can neither respect
nor accommodate the beliefs of such groups. Legislative prayer has survived this
long because the American people have been willing to accept the practice.17
However, the public’s acquiescence will not last forever, especially considering
that the number of people who do not affiliate themselves with any particular religion

8. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
9. Id. at 784–85.
10. Id. at 793.
11. Id. at 794–95.
12. Id. at 792 (“In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has
become part of the fabric of our society.”).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our
Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists
and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”).
17. See Voters Say We Can Pray in Public Meetings, FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY
(Apr. 21, 2014), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2014/letuspray/final.pdf (finding that 73% of
voters approved of legislative prayer).
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(“the Nones”)18 is growing.19
Before discussing the future of legislative prayer, it will be useful to review its
past. Part I of this Note discusses Marsh, including its reasoning, its meaning, and
its effects. Part II reviews the implementation and modification of Marsh by the
circuit courts. Part III turns to Galloway, analyzing the decision and evaluating its
future implications. Finally, Part IV applies the strategic model20 of judicial
decision making to help explain legislative prayer’s past and future, explores the
impact of the Nones, and proposes a few alternatives to legislative prayer,
including nonreligious opening statements, moments of silence, and public forums.
A survey of the cases from Marsh through Galloway demonstrates that
legislative prayer’s continued existence threatens the religious liberty protected by
the First Amendment.21 In the context of town board meetings such as those in
Galloway, the danger is especially great. Unlike the meetings of Congress or state
legislatures, town board meetings involve direct democracy. The government
cannot subject its citizens to a state-sponsored religious practice as the cost of
participation in government.22
I. UNDERSTANDING MARSH AND ITS MEANING
Marsh v. Chambers is a curious decision. After all, if the Establishment Clause
and the separation of church and state23 mean anything, it seems (if only as a matter

18. The term “Nones” was coined by Professor Barry A. Kosmin of Trinity College.
Wendy Thomas Russell, An Interview with the Guy Who Named the “Nones” (Jan. 10, 2013),
http://wendythomasrussell.com/nones/. The term is “a label for a diverse group of people who
do not identify with any of the myriad of religious options in the American religious
marketplace—the irreligious, the unreligious, the anti-religious, and the anti-clerical. Some
believe in God; some do not. Some may participate occasionally in religious rituals; others
never will.” BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR WITH RYAN CRAGUN & JUHEM
NAVARRO-RIVERA, AMERICAN NONES: THE PROFILE OF THE NO RELIGION POPULATION i (2009),
available at http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/2011/08/NONES_08.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Yasmin Anwar, Americans and Religion Increasingly Parting Ways, New
Survey Shows, UC BERKELEY NEWS CENTER (Mar. 12, 2013), http://newscenter.berkeley.edu
/2013/03/12/non-believers/.
20. See generally Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001).
21. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000) (“But the
religious liberty protected by the Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively
sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.”); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (finding that the Establishment Clause
“guarantee[s] religious liberty and equality to ‘the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a
non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism’” (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52
(1985))), abrogated on other grounds by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
22. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) (“It is a tenet of the First Amendment
that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the
price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.”).
23. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (“In the words of
[Thomas] Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
‘a wall of separation between church and State.’” (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98
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of common sense) that a legislature should not pray to God and seek divine
guidance in the performance of its legislative duties.
By grounding its decision in a predominantly historical analysis, the Supreme Court
ignored and rejected its own Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including the test
established in Lemon v. Kurtzman24 just a dozen years earlier. To pass constitutional
muster under the Lemon test, the challenged statute or policy must have a secular
legislative purpose, its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it
“must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”25 In order to
uphold Nebraska’s practice as constitutional, the Marsh Court needed to ignore
Lemon. As Justice Brennan observed in dissent, “[I]f any group of law students were
asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they would
nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”26
Nor was there any other test the Court could have applied from its previous
Establishment Clause cases to uphold Nebraska’s legislative prayer policy. Even
before Lemon, the Court had declared a rule that the government must remain
neutral in religious matters. This “neutrality principle” was most clearly articulated
in Epperson v. Arkansas:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in
matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile
to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid,
foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or
even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and nonreligion.27
The Marsh Court disregarded the neutrality principle by upholding the plainly
religious practice of legislative prayer,28 but it did so without overruling Epperson,
Lemon, or any of its other Establishment Clause cases. The Court thus created an
exception to the Establishment Clause, “rather than reshaping Establishment Clause
doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer.”29 The obvious question is: Why? One
possibility is that the Court responded strategically to external institutional
pressures.30 In a post-Marsh case involving the constitutionality of a Ten
Commandments display, Justice Scalia provided an explanation for the Court’s
inconsistent approach to religious neutrality:

U.S. 145, 164 (1878))).
24. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25. Id. at 612–13 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).
28. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“That the ‘purpose’ of
legislative prayer is pre-eminently religious rather than secular seems to me to be
self-evident. ‘To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws[]’
is nothing but a religious act.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting the opinion of
the Court at 792)).
29. Id. at 796.
30. For a more detailed discussion of how external pressures influence judicial decision
making, see infra Part IV.
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What, then, could be the genuine “good reason” for occasionally
ignoring the neutrality principle? I suggest it is the instinct for
self-preservation, and the recognition that the Court, which “has no
influence over either the sword or the purse,” cannot go too far down
the road of an enforced neutrality that contradicts both historical fact
and current practice without losing all that sustains it: the willingness of
the people to accept its interpretation of the Constitution as definitive,
in preference to the contrary interpretation of the democratically elected
branches.31
In its attempt to preserve itself, the Marsh Court disregarded the neutrality
principle and its own jurisprudence, relying on a version of history that was
incomplete at best and distorted at worst.32 The resulting decision created more
questions than it answered and offered little help to courts in future legislative
prayer cases.33
A. Oversimplified History
The Marsh Court’s unusual reliance on historical tradition rather than judicial
precedent has been criticized for two separate reasons. First, scholars such as
Professor Michael W. McConnell have argued that the Court’s history-focused
approach does not help us interpret the meaning of the Constitution.34 Second, there
is evidence that the Court’s account of history was not entirely accurate.35
Turning to the first objection, the Court’s use of historical analysis is troubling
because the majority uses history to avoid engaging in a meaningful discussion of
Establishment Clause principles. “In light of the unambiguous and unbroken
history of more than 200 years,” Chief Justice Burger wrote, “there can be no doubt
that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the
fabric of our society.”36 By glossing over any arguments to the contrary, the Court
produced an opinion that is “simply insufficient.”37 While the Court paid lip service
to the idea that “historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of
constitutional guarantees,”38 it failed to provide any convincing reason that would

31. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 892–93 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
32. See infra Part I.A.
33. See infra Parts I.B and II.
34. Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359,
362–63 (1988) (“So far as one can tell from the Court’s opinion, there is simply an exception
from the establishment clause for legislative chaplains . . . . The decision casts no light on
the meaning of the constitutional provision. Indeed, it can be said that Marsh v. Chambers
does not interpret the Constitution at all.”).
35. Justice Brennan made this point in his dissenting opinion: “[I]n general, the history of
legislative prayer has been far more eventful—and divisive—than a hasty reading of the Court’s
opinion might indicate.” Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 792.
37. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 841 (1993).
38. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
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justify violating the principle of religious neutrality. The Court’s conclusory
assertions failed to satisfy scholars such as McConnell, who argued that:
Marsh v. Chambers represents original intent subverting the principle
of the rule of law. Unless we can articulate some principle that explains
why legislative chaplains might not violate the establishment clause,
and demonstrate that that principle continues to be applicable today, we
cannot uphold a practice that so clearly violates fundamental principles
we recognize under the clause.39
The Court compounded its failure to provide a principled basis for its decision
by oversimplifying the historical narrative it relied upon. The majority opinion
noted that the First Congress in 1789 adopted a policy of hiring chaplains to open
sessions of both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate.40 Congress
approved the Bill of Rights just three days after authorizing the appointment of paid
chaplains, and the Court accepted this as proof that “the men who wrote the First
Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening
prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with
prayer has continued without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”41
Professor Christopher C. Lund reviewed the history of the congressional
chaplaincies and concluded that this history was both more contentious and more
complicated than the Marsh opinion would suggest.42 Consider Lund’s response to
the Court’s assertion that legislative prayer “is simply a tolerable acknowledgment
of beliefs widely held among the people of this country”43:
This is simply wrong, and almost risibly so. It perpetuates the very false
illusion that the chaplaincies were altogether innocuous and universally
supported; it ignores all of the ways in which the chaplaincies were
sometimes controversial and divisive. In the end, the Court’s desire to
portray the chaplaincies as benign ends up distorting its historical
analysis. Marsh wanted the chaplaincies to seem sterile, but this
required disinfecting parts of the relevant history.44
One of the parts that “required disinfecting” was the widespread prejudice against
American Catholics in the nineteenth century.45 The 1832 election of Charles
Constantine Pise, the first Catholic Senate chaplain,46 led to calls for the abolition
of the chaplaincies.47 Pise left office after less than a year,48 and neither the House

39. McConnell, supra note 34, at 362 (emphasis in original).
40. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787–88.
41. Id. at 788.
42. See generally Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171 (2009).
43. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
44. Lund, supra note 42, at 1213.
45. See id. at 1187–93.
46. Id. at 1187.
47. Id. at 1189.
48. Id. at 1190.
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nor the Senate elected another Catholic chaplain until the year 2000.49 According to
Lund, the fierce opposition to Catholic chaplains contradicts the Marsh Court’s
assertion that legislative prayer does not place the government’s seal of approval on
the prayer giver’s religious viewpoint50—“that was precisely why it became so
important to prevent Catholic priests from becoming congressional chaplains.”51
The Marsh Court also downplayed the opposition to legislative prayer by some
of the Founding Fathers. Although the Court acknowledged that John Jay and John
Rutledge opposed the practice,52 it did not “agree that evidence of opposition to a
measure weakens the force of the historical argument; indeed it infuses it with
power by demonstrating that the subject was considered carefully and the action
not taken thoughtlessly.”53 It is difficult to take this argument seriously. Essentially,
the Court asserted that a practice or policy deserves greater deference when it was
less popular at the time of its adoption.
The majority also failed to mention that both James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson opposed governmental prayer. Although Madison, while in Congress,
voted in favor of the appropriations bill that authorized the payment of
congressional chaplains, he “consistently opposed the chaplaincies throughout his
political life.”54 As President, Jefferson “refused to issue Thanksgiving prayers
because he understood them to violate the Establishment Clause’s prohibition
against governmental ‘recommendation’ of religion.”55 The positions of Madison
and Jefferson cast serious doubt over the Marsh Court’s hasty conclusion that the
drafters of the First Amendment “saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause
arising from a practice of [legislative] prayer.”56
B. Unresolved Questions
Why would the Court rest its decision on such a weak historical foundation? Justice
Scalia’s theory of self-preservation57 may have been a factor. Justice Brennan alluded
to this possibility at the end of his dissent: “If the Court had struck down legislative
prayer today, it would likely have stimulated a furious reaction.”58 The majority
opinion observed that the practice of legislative prayer had continued uninterrupted in

49. Id. at 1191–92.
50. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
51. Lund, supra note 42, at 1213.
52. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791.
53. Id.
54. Lund, supra note 42, at 1185–86 (citing Andy G. Olree, James Madison and
Legislative Chaplains, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 221 (2008)); see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at
807–08 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that after Madison left the Presidency, he wrote that
congressional chaplains were inconsistent with the Constitution and with religious freedom).
55. Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097,
1128 (2006).
56. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791.
57. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
58. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 822 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Congress since it first began,59 and it had been “followed consistently in most of the
states.”60 Justice Brennan was surely correct that striking down such a widely accepted
practice would provoke a strong, and likely furious, reaction.
Given the widespread political and popular support for legislative prayer, the Court
had little choice in the matter. Lund compared Marsh to the controversy the Court
faced regarding the inclusion of the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.61
In both cases, “while precedent clearly led to the conclusion that the government’s
action was unconstitutional, political realities cut strongly the other way.”62
Whatever the reasons for the Court’s decision in Marsh, the lower courts were
stuck with it. Unfortunately, the decision proved difficult to interpret and
implement. The language of the majority opinion left open several questions that
must be answered when deciding a legislative prayer case, and various courts
provided inconsistent answers.63
First, it was unclear whether Marsh required legislative prayers to be
nonsectarian. In determining that the prayers delivered by the Nebraska
legislature’s chaplain, Robert Palmer, did not violate the Establishment Clause, the
Court noted that his prayers were “in the Judeo-Christian tradition.”64 In a footnote,
the Court then added, “Palmer characterizes his prayers as ‘nonsectarian,’ ‘Judeo
Christian,’ and with ‘elements of the American civil religion.’ Although some of his
earlier prayers were often explicitly Christian, Palmer removed all references to
Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish legislator.”65 Did this footnote mean that
only nonsectarian prayers pass constitutional muster under Marsh? In County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,66 the
Supreme Court said yes: “The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate
this principle because the particular chaplain had removed all references to Christ.”67
Despite this pronouncement from the Allegheny Court, the question remained
unsettled until Galloway. There, the Court ruled that sectarian prayers are
permissible, as long as the prayer practice does not reflect an attempt “to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”68
Another key holding from Marsh that required clarification was the proscription
on impermissible motives. When evaluating whether Palmer’s sixteen-year tenure
as chaplain violated the Establishment Clause, the Court determined that “Palmer
was reappointed because his performance and personal qualities were acceptable to
the body appointing him.”69 The Court held that, “[a]bsent proof that the chaplain’s

59. Id. at 788.
60. Id. at 788–89.
61. Lund, supra note 42, at 1209 (referring to Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1 (2004)).
62. Lund, supra note 42, at 1209.
63. See infra Part II.
64. Marsh, 463 U.S at 793.
65. Id. at 793 n.14 (citations omitted).
66. 492 U.S. 573 (1989), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
67. Id. at 603 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (2014) (quoting Marsh, 463
U.S. at 794–95).
69. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793.
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reappointment stemmed from an impermissible motive, . . . his long tenure does not
in itself conflict with the Establishment Clause.”70 The Court failed to define
exactly what would constitute an impermissible motive, but it implied that
choosing a prayer giver for the purpose of advancing a particular religion would be
impermissible.71 Unfortunately, this language will likely continue to cause
problems for lower courts because Galloway also referred to “an impermissible
government purpose”72 without defining the term.
Additionally, it was unclear when (if ever) a court should review the contents of
particular prayers. The Marsh Court explained:
The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here,
there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief. That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation
or to parse the content of a particular prayer.73
This suggests that the content of a prayer should only be evaluated when there is
evidence that “the prayer opportunity has been exploited.”74 But this is problematic
because the best evidence of exploitation will often be the contents of the prayers
themselves. In such a case, would a court be permitted to review the prayers, or is
extrinsic evidence of exploitation required?
Perhaps most importantly, if we assume that Marsh’s historical inquiry is not the
proper framework for analyzing a legislative prayer case, should the Lemon test or
some other test be applied? The Galloway majority, like the Marsh Court, relied on
the history of legislative prayer, but Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion reflected a
preference for the so-called coercion test over other Establishment Clause tests.75
II. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
A review of recent legislative prayer cases in the circuit courts will shed further
light on Marsh’s shortcomings. An examination of how Galloway clarified—or
failed to clarify—the questions raised by Marsh reveals that a lower court will still
be in a difficult position when faced with a legislative prayer case. These
difficulties lead to the conclusion that legislative prayer and the Establishment
Clause are simply incompatible.76 Although the Galloway Court abrogated
Allegheny and approved sectarian prayers,77 this Part begins by reviewing the ways

70. Id. at 793–94.
71. See id. at 793 (“We cannot, any more than Members of the Congresses of this
century, perceive any suggestion that choosing a clergyman of one denomination advances
the beliefs of a particular church.”).
72. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1824.
73. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95.
74. Id. at 794.
75. See infra Part III.C.
76. See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 1023 (2010) (“Religious liberty for all cannot really be
served in any legislative prayer scheme.” (emphasis in original)).
77. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1823 (“In rejecting the suggestion that legislative prayer
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that the circuit courts addressed this question before Galloway, and by asking
whether Galloway answered that question correctly.
A. Should Legislative Prayers Be Nonsectarian?
As a matter of interpretation, the Galloway Court’s conclusion that Marsh did not
require nonsectarian prayers seems correct. The word “nonsectarian” appeared just
once in Marsh’s majority opinion—and only in a footnote, at that.78 Lund noted that
Allegheny’s interpretation of Marsh was “a revisionary sort of summary.”79 The
Court transformed the chaplain’s removal of the references to Christ from a mere
“background fact” into “a central holding of the case.”80 Even assuming Galloway
correctly interpreted Marsh, should there be a nonsectarian requirement?
In a 2008 article,81 Kenneth A. Klukowski made a compelling argument that
perhaps nonsectarian prayers should not be required. If naming a particular deity—
such as Christ—renders a prayer impermissibly sectarian, then all members of
religions whose faiths require them to pray in the name of a specific deity are
categorically excluded from delivering a prayer.82 Justice Brennan expressed the
same concern in Marsh.83 The Fourth Circuit confronted this problem in Turner v.
City Council of Fredericksburg,84 a pre-Galloway case in which a city council
member challenged the city’s nondenominational prayer policy because his religion
required him to pray in the name of Jesus Christ.85 In Turner, the court stopped
short of saying that nonsectarian prayers were constitutionally required, but held
that the nonsectarian policy fit “squarely within the range of conduct permitted by
Marsh.”86 Turner’s unwillingness to pray in accordance with the city’s policy did
not amount to a violation of his First Amendment rights because he “remain[ed]
free to pray on his own behalf, in nongovernmental endeavors, in the manner
dictated by his conscience.”87
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Turner was perfectly reasonable—after all, no
one has a First Amendment right to deliver a legislative prayer. Yet there does
seem to be something unfair about it. Unless Turner violated his own religious
must be nonsectarian, the Court does not imply that no constraints remain on its content.”).
78. Marsh, 463 U.S at 793 n.14.
79. Lund, supra note 76, at 995.
80. Id.
81. Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the Establishment Clause
Train Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2008).
82. Id. at 255.
83. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Some would find a prayer not
invoking the name of Christ to represent a flawed view of the relationship between human
beings and God.” (emphasis in original)); see also Eric J. Segall, Mired in the Marsh:
Legislative Prayers, Moments of Silence, and the Establishment Clause, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV.
713, 730 (2009) (“Some spiritual leaders, when given the choice between offering a
nondenominational, nonsectarian prayer or no prayer at all, will certainly choose the latter.
This choice therefore discriminates against those clergy who want to offer sectarian prayers
and those legislators who want to hear them.”).
84. 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008).
85. Id. at 353–54.
86. Id. at 356.
87. Id.
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beliefs, he could not participate in the city’s supposedly nondenominational prayer
practice. If the Establishment Clause truly commands “that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another,”88 then a policy that
prefers religions that do not require adherents to pray to specific deities is difficult
to justify. On the other hand, the court could have relied on Marsh’s prohibition of
“impermissible motives”89 and ruled against the city because Turner had been
excluded on the basis of his religious beliefs. This result would have been just as
defensible as the one the Fourth Circuit actually reached. This sort of problem,
where there seemingly is no right answer, is typical of legislative prayer cases in
the post-Marsh era.
Three years after Turner, the Fourth Circuit ruled on another legislative prayer
practice in Joyner v. Forsyth County.90 The case involved a challenge to the
Forsyth County Board of Commissioners’ prayer practice, which involved prayers
delivered by volunteers from religious congregations in the community.91 The court
struck down the policy because, based on its interpretation of Marsh and
Allegheny,92 the prayers were impermissibly sectarian; “[a]lmost four-fifths of the
prayers delivered after the adoption of the policy referenced Jesus Christ. None of
the prayers mentioned any other deity.”93 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit gave a
ringing endorsement to the nonsectarian standard: “Sectarian prayers must not
serve as the gateway to citizen participation in the affairs of local government. To
have them do so runs afoul of the promise of public neutrality among faiths that
resides at the heart of the First Amendment’s religion clauses.”94
Justice Kagan made a similar argument in her Galloway dissent. She objected to
Justice Kennedy’s claim that sectarian prayers could be “part of our heritage and
tradition, part of our expressive idiom,”95 and argued that such prayers “express
beliefs that are fundamental to some, foreign to others—and because that is so they
carry the ever-present potential to both exclude and divide.”96
Both sides of this debate present strong arguments. On one hand, requiring
nonsectarian prayers would unintentionally exclude people whose religions require
them to pray to certain deities. And, as the Galloway majority argued, such a
requirement would force legislatures and courts “to act as supervisors and censors
of religious speech,”97 further entangling the government with religion. On the
other hand, allowing sectarian prayers would cause feelings of exclusion and
division for members of other faiths, particularly religious minorities. The
unavoidability of this conflict demonstrates that any legislative prayer practice
likely violates the neutrality principle and therefore the Establishment Clause.

88. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
89. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–94 (1983).
90. 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011).
91. Id. at 342–43.
92. See id. at 352 (noting that “Allegheny read Marsh as precluding sectarian prayer”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
93. Id. at 353.
94. Id. at 342–43.
95. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014) (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 1853 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1822.
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B. Impermissible Motives and Religious Discrimination
Both Marsh and Galloway included references to “impermissible” motives or
purposes.98 Although neither case defined the term, it would presumably be
impermissible for a government entity to exclude someone from its prayer practice
solely because of her religious beliefs.99 That was one of the issues faced by the
Fourth Circuit in Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors.100
This case concerned a challenge to the county’s prayer practice by Cynthia
Simpson, a member of the Reclaiming Tradition of Wicca who had identified
herself as a witch when she asked to be added to the list of potential prayer
givers.101 The County Attorney refused her request because the “non-sectarian
invocations [were] traditionally made to a divinity that [was] consistent with the
Judeo-Christian tradition.”102 Simpson contended that this amounted to an
impermissible advancement of Judeo-Christian religions.103 The court never
seriously considered the possibility that the county had relied on an impermissible
motive in rejecting Simpson’s request,104 instead upholding the prayer practice
because the policy “aspired to non-sectarianism,”105 had “achieved diversity,”106
and was “wide enough . . . to include Islam.”107 These are all admirable qualities,
but they have no bearing on the central issue in the case—that Simpson’s request to
be included among the county’s prayer givers was denied expressly because of her
religious beliefs. As Lund noted, the case “seems to vitiate the impermissible
motive requirement altogether; it is hard to imagine a clearer case of
denominational discrimination than what happened to Cynthia Simpson.”108

98. Id. at 1824 (“Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or
betray an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a
prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation.”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 793–94 (1983) (“Absent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed from an
impermissible motive, we conclude that his long tenure does not in itself conflict with the
Establishment Clause.”).
99. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held that the impermissible motive
standard “prohibits purposeful discrimination.” Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263,
1281 (11th Cir. 2008).
100. 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005).
101. Id. at 278–80.
102. Id. at 280.
103. Id.
104. The court’s application of the impermissible motive requirement amounted to a
single sentence: “Marsh’s caution against ‘impermissible motives’ does not fasten on local
governments a limitation to a prayer-giver from one religious view.” Id. at 287 (emphasis in
original). While this statement is undoubtedly true, it is difficult to see how it is at all
relevant to the facts of the case.
105. Id. at 284.
106. Id. at 285.
107. Id. at 286.
108. Lund, supra note 76, at 1027–28; accord Fourth Circuit Holds That Local
Government May Restrict the Leading of Its Invocations to Representatives of JudeoChristian Religion: Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1223, 1229 (2006) [hereinafter Fourth Circuit Holds] (“From the viewpoint of
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Interestingly, Simpson would have been wrongly decided even under
Galloway’s more permissive standard. One of Galloway’s few requirements is that
the government entity maintain “a policy of nondiscrimination.”109 By excluding
Simpson because of her religious beliefs, Chesterfield County failed that test.
Unfortunately, the Galloway Court did not specify which government purposes are
impermissible or discriminatory, and therefore produced a standard as vague and
malleable as Marsh itself. Consequently, some future plaintiffs may suffer the same
fate as Simpson.
C. When May Courts Review the Content of Prayers?
In Pelphrey v. Cobb County,110 the Eleventh Circuit considered a challenge to a
county commission’s prayer practice. A rotating group of volunteers delivered the
prayers.111 The plaintiffs, relying on Allegheny’s interpretation of Marsh, argued
that the prayers were impermissibly sectarian.112 The court held that the county’s
“diversity of speakers . . . support[ed] the finding that the County did not exploit
the prayers to advance any one religion,”113 even though 96.6% of the prayer givers
were Christian and 70% of the prayers included Christian references.114 Further, the
court avoided any examination of the prayers’ language by citing Marsh for the
proposition that a court should not evaluate or parse a prayer’s content unless there
is evidence that the prayer opportunity has been exploited.115
In Joyner, the Fourth Circuit took the opposite approach and provided a
persuasive answer to the question of when—and why—courts may review the
contents of specific prayers under Marsh. The dissent objected to the majority’s
examination of the references to Christ in the prayers.116 The majority responded by
explaining that Marsh only prevents a court from examining the prayers if there is
no evidence that the prayer opportunity has been exploited.117 The court expanded
on this concept:
[T]he dissent gives the impression that virtually any review by the
majority of the invocations under challenge would constitute
impermissible “parsing.” Quite simply, this stark approach leaves the
religions outside the Judeo-Christian tradition, however, the Board’s policy is more
exclusive than inclusive. . . . [L]imiting eligibility to Judeo-Christianity excludes in terms of
religious diversity far more than it includes.”).
109. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014).
110. 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008).
111. Id. at 1266.
112. See id. (“The taxpayers argue that the Establishment Clause permits only
nonsectarian prayers . . . .”).
113. Id. at 1277.
114. Id. at 1267.
115. Id. at 1272 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983)).
116. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 361 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemeyer, J.,
dissenting) (“This focus by the majority on the December 17 prayer, simply because of its
description of Jesus’ role in Christianity, is precisely the content-inquiry that Marsh intended
to foreclose. With such an inquiry, must we now determine how many times the name Jesus
is spoken or what description of him is given?”).
117. Id. at 351–52.
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court without the ability to decide the case, by barring any substantive
consideration of the very practice under challenge. It is to say the least
an odd view of the judicial function that denies courts the right to
review the practice at issue. For to exercise no review at all—to shut
our eyes to patterns of sectarian prayer in public forums—is to
surrender the essence of the Establishment Clause and allow
government to throw its weight behind a particular faith. Marsh did not
countenance any such idea.118
This is a reasonable understanding of the language in Marsh. Marsh’s prohibition
on parsing prayers should only be applied when the content of the prayers is not an
issue (where, for example, a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a prayer
practice in general but makes no allegations regarding specific prayers). But when a
plaintiff claims that the nature and language of the prayers made the prayer practice
impermissible, the prayers’ content will obviously be essential to the court’s
evaluation. The Galloway Court provided a slightly different interpretation:
Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray
an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the
content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation.
Marsh, indeed, requires an inquiry into the prayer opportunity as a whole,
rather than into the contents of a single prayer.119
While this approach initially seems fair and reasonable, it leads to unacceptable
results. The Galloway Court acknowledged that one of the town’s prayer givers
referred to the plaintiffs as a “minority . . . ignorant of the history of our
country,”120 and that this attack “strayed from the rationale set out in Marsh,”121 but
nonetheless “[did] not despoil a practice that on the whole reflects and embraces
our tradition.”122 The Supreme Court essentially said, in other words, “It’s OK if
the government’s prayers disparage the religious beliefs of others, so long as they
don’t do it too often.” Any American who respects the First Amendment and
religious liberty should be appalled.
As the cases discussed in this Part demonstrate, Galloway did not resolve many
of the issues the circuit courts struggled with in the years following Marsh. The
Court did clarify (for better or worse) that legislative prayers may be sectarian. But
Galloway brought us no closer to a workable definition of an “impermissible”
motive or purpose, and the Court expanded Marsh with its rationale that the
prayers’ content may only be examined when a plaintiff challenges an entire pattern
of prayers. A single prayer, no matter how offensive, is effectively unreviewable.
The inconsistent results in the circuit courts prove that Marsh (and therefore
Galloway) is too malleable, too easily manipulated. The frequent presence of
compelling arguments on both sides suggests that it may be impossible to craft a
legislative prayer policy that does not violate someone’s constitutional rights. The

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 351.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014).
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1824.
Id.
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following Part addresses the Galloway case in greater detail and evaluates the
impact this landmark decision will have on future Establishment Clause cases.
III. TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY
A. The Town’s Prayer Practice
In Galloway, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the legislative
prayer practice in the town of Greece, New York, a Rochester suburb with a
population of about 94,000.123 Plaintiffs Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens
claimed that the town board violated the Establishment Clause by starting its
monthly board meetings with prayers.124 The board implemented its prayer practice
in 1999 (meetings previously began with moments of silence).125 The prayer givers
appeared by invitation; a town employee solicited local clergy by calling religious
organizations that were listed in the town’s Community Guide.126 All of the prayer
givers from 1999 through 2007 were Christian.127 Galloway and Stephens first
complained about the prayer practice in 2008.128 That year, four non-Christians
delivered prayers; in 2009 and 2010, “all the prayer-givers were once again invited
Christian clergy.”129 About two-thirds of the prayers “contained uniquely Christian
language.”130 When delivering a prayer, the speaker faced the citizens attending the
meeting, with his or her back to the members of the board.131 The prayer givers
“often asked members of the audience to participate by bowing their heads,
standing, or joining in the prayer.”132
When Galloway and Stephens filed suit, they claimed that the town’s selection
procedure preferred Christianity over other faiths, and that the prayer practice was
impermissibly sectarian.133 They later abandoned their claim of intentional
discrimination against non-Christians, eliminating the impermissible motive
issue.134 The town claimed that anyone who volunteered could give a prayer,
including atheists, and that it had never rejected such a request.135 The town
admitted, however, that it had never publicized this opportunity to the town’s
residents.136 The town did not review the prayers in advance, and it asserted that “it

123. Id. at 1816.
124. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct.
1811 (2014).
125. Id. at 23.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 24.
131. Brief for Respondents at 8–9, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014)
(No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5230742, at *8–9.
132. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23.
133. Id. at 25.
134. Id. at 26.
135. Id. at 23.
136. Id.
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would not censor an invocation, no matter how unusual or offensive its content.”137
Indeed, the town took no action even after the prayer that described opponents of
the town’s practice as a “minority . . . ignorant of the history of our country.”138
B. The Second Circuit Opinion
The Second Circuit ruled that the town’s prayer practice violated the
Establishment Clause,139 but did not read Allegheny as a requirement that all
legislative prayers be nonsectarian.140 Instead of applying a strict nonsectarian
requirement, the court resolved the Establishment Clause question by asking
whether the town’s practice, viewed in its totality by an ordinary,
reasonable observer, conveyed the view that the town favored or
disfavored certain religious beliefs. In other words, we must ask
whether the town, through its prayer practice, has established particular
religious beliefs as the more acceptable ones, and others as less
acceptable.141
While this fact-specific inquiry might appear to be a rejection of Marsh, the court
justified its deviation on the grounds that Marsh itself “addressed a series of
case-specific concerns raised by the plaintiff.”142 The court ostensibly declined to
apply the Lemon test143 or any other Establishment Clause test because Marsh did
not follow that approach,144 and the court believed that Marsh should be the
“touchstone” of its analysis.145
Despite these statements to the contrary, the Second Circuit’s analysis had a
distinctly Lemon flavor.146 Specifically, the opinion calls to mind Justice O’Connor’s
“endorsement test,” which was an interpretation of the effect prong of the Lemon
test.147 Although the Second Circuit never used the phrase “endorsement test,” it
struck down Greece’s prayer practice because it amounted to an endorsement of

137. Id.
138. Id. at 25; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
139. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32 (“[W]e find that on the totality of the circumstances
presented the town’s prayer practice identified the town with Christianity in violation of the
Establishment Clause.”).
140. Id. at 28.
141. Id. at 29–30 (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 30.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25.
144. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30.
145. Id. at 29.
146. That was my only lemon pun. I hope you enjoyed it.
147. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The
effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to
either question should render the challenged practice invalid.”).
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religion148 and “convey[ed] to a reasonable objective observer under the totality of
the circumstances an official affiliation with a particular religion.”149
By implicitly relying on the endorsement test, the Second Circuit stumbled
(perhaps unwittingly) into a debate about what should be the prevailing analytical
framework in Establishment Clause cases. The most important legacy of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Galloway may be its impact on that larger
Establishment Clause debate, rather than its effects on legislative prayer itself.
C. The Supreme Court Decision and Its Future Effects
1. The Coercion Argument
Although the Second Circuit relied on an endorsement analysis, Galloway and
Stephens did not urge the Supreme Court to adopt that reasoning on appeal.
Instead, they once again argued that the prayer practice was impermissibly
sectarian, and that the prayers were a form of governmental coercion.150 As noted
above, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas) abrogated Allegheny by holding that Marsh
does not require nonsectarian prayers.151 The coercion argument—and the Court’s
response to it—requires a more detailed explanation.
Before the Second Circuit, Galloway and Stephens argued that the presence of
children at the meetings created a threat of religious coercion.152 Children
sometimes led the Pledge of Allegiance and high school students could fulfill a
civics requirement by attending the meetings.153 The board also invited children to
the meetings to receive awards.154
Galloway and Stephens likely referred to children when objecting to the
coercive potential of the prayer policy because the Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause coercion doctrine was developed in two school prayer cases, Lee v.
Weisman155 and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.156 In Lee, the Court
(with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority) ruled that a school had violated the
Establishment Clause by having a rabbi deliver a nonsectarian prayer at a
graduation ceremony.157 The Court found that “prayer exercises in public schools

148. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30.
149. Id. at 34.
150. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1820 (2014).
151. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
152. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 33 n.8.
153. Id. at 23.
154. Brief for Respondents at 27, supra note 131, at *27.
155. 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise . . . .”).
156. 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) (“Even if we regard every high school student’s decision
to attend a home football game as purely voluntary, we are nevertheless persuaded that the
delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate
in an act of religious worship.”).
157. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 594–96.
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carry a particular risk of indirect coercion,”158 and that the school had placed
“public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group
or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.”159 In
Santa Fe, the Supreme Court struck down a school’s practice of beginning high
school football games with student-led prayers partly because it would be coercive
to force the students to choose “between attending [the football] games and
avoiding personally offensive religious rituals.”160
However, Galloway and Stephens could not simply rely on Lee and Santa Fe
because the Court’s approach to legislative prayer has been much more deferential
than its approach to school prayer. In 1962, Engel v. Vitale161 held that New York
could not use its public school system to encourage the recitation of prayers.162
After Engel, federal courts have consistently enforced the separation of prayer and
public education.163 Marsh required no such separation in the legislative prayer
context.164 Perhaps for this reason, Galloway and Stephens did not limit their
coercion argument to the prayers’ effects on children. They asserted that they had
personally felt coerced by requests to participate in the prayers, and that they “felt
isolated, embarrassed, and humiliated when they [had] declined to participate while
those around them stared.”165
Furthermore, Galloway and Stephens argued, a citizen who attends a meeting to
request a permit or to seek some other action from the board would feel coerced to
participate in the prayer or risk having her request denied.166 During oral
arguments, Justice Kagan expressed similar concerns:

158. Id. at 592.
159. Id. at 593.
160. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312.
161. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
162. Id. at 424.
163. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312 (striking down prayers before high school
football games); Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (striking down prayers at high school graduation
ceremony); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (striking down Alabama statute
requiring a moment of silence in public schools for reflection or voluntary prayer); Sch. Dist.
of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (striking down state laws requiring
the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer and Bible verses in public schools); Doe v. Indian River
Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 282 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying Marsh and holding that prayers at
school board meetings violated Establishment Clause); Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd.,
473 F.3d 188, 204–05 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that sectarian prayers at school board
meetings violated Establishment Clause), rev’d on standing grounds, 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir.
2007); Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 376 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying Lemon and holding
that supper prayers at state-sponsored military college violated Establishment Clause); Coles
ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 385–86 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying Lemon
and holding that prayers before school board meetings violated Establishment Clause).
164. See generally supra Part I.
165. Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 15.
166. Id. at 24 (“[A]pplicants cannot afford to offend anyone. Perhaps no Board member
would think less of a citizen who refused to participate in the prayer. But the citizen has no
way to know.” (emphasis in original)).
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[W]hat troubles me about this case is that here a citizen is going to a
local community board, supposed to be the closest, the most responsive
institution of government that exists, and is immediately being asked,
being forced to identify whether she believes in the things that most of
the people in the room believe in, whether she belongs to the same
religious idiom as most of the people in the room do.
And it strikes me that that might be inconsistent with this
understanding that when we relate to our government, we all do so as
Americans, and not as Jews and not as Christians and not as
nonbelievers.167
This is one of the most important factual differences between Galloway and
Marsh. As Galloway and Stephens argued in their brief, “In both Congress and state
legislatures, ordinary citizens are excluded from the legislative floor and confined to
a gallery. They are mere spectators, not permitted to address the legislative body and
with no business to conduct before it.”168 The direct interaction between citizens and
government officials in the town meeting context creates a greater risk of infringing
on individuals’ First Amendment rights and a greater risk of conveying the
impression that the government prefers certain religious views over others.
The Town of Greece responded to the claims of coercion by arguing that
because the town never “compelled anyone to pray or to agree with the viewpoints
of the prayer-givers, or . . . conditioned any governmental benefits on participation,
the mere fact that attendees at meetings might disagree with a prayer [was]
insufficient to constitute an Establishment Clause violation.”169 But even if
participation in the prayers was not compelled, being required to attend a religious
ceremony or exercise still violates the Establishment Clause.170 Participation in
democracy is one of the most fundamental rights of American citizenship.171 It is a
violation of the Establishment Clause to require citizens to attend a religious
ceremony they may not agree with—especially when it contains sectarian
references to a God they may not believe in—before they are allowed to participate
in the democratic process.172 If the school district in Santa Fe could not force its

167. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5939896, at *24.
168. Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 42.
169. Brief for Petitioner at 40, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No.
12-696), 2013 WL 3935899, at *40.
170. See Paulsen, supra note 37, at 843 n.171 (“[I]f government requires a Christian to
attend a Jewish worship service in a way that does not require the Christian to violate any of
her religious obligations as a Christian, there is no Free Exercise Clause violation. But
required attendance at the Jewish worship service would still be an Establishment Clause
violation.” (emphasis in original)); accord Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 31 (“No
one would claim that government may require citizens to attend religious services as long as
they are free to disbelieve what is preached there.”).
171. Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 22.
172. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) (“It is a tenet of the First
Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and
benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.”); Joyner
v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Sectarian prayers must not serve as
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students to choose between attending football games and hearing unwanted
prayers,173 then surely the Town of Greece could not force its citizens to choose
between participating in democracy and hearing unwanted prayers, right?
Wrong, said Justice Kennedy.
In his plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,
Justice Kennedy declared that “legislative bodies do not engage in impermissible
coercion merely by exposing constituents to prayer they would rather not hear and
in which they need not participate.”174 He stated that no coercion exists “where the
prayers neither chastised dissenters nor attempted lengthy disquisition on religious
dogma,”175 and where the citizens “are free to enter and leave with little comment
and for any number of reasons.”176 Of course, at least one prayer did chastise
dissenters,177 and the prayers did include statements of religious dogma,178 and people
attending a graduation ceremony or a football game may also enter and leave for any
number of reasons. Justice Kennedy nonetheless determined (somehow) that the
prayers in Galloway were less coercive than those in Lee or Santa Fe.
Before analyzing the likely effects of the Court’s decision, it may be helpful to
consider why Galloway and Stephens based their argument on coercion rather than
endorsement. After all, the Second Circuit ruled in their favor by applying a version
of the endorsement test,179 and the coercion test is generally more permissive of
governmental religious practices. The endorsement test prohibits government
actions that “convey a message of endorsement or disapproval” of religion.180 The
coercion test, meanwhile, states that “government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its exercise.”181 Consequently, Professor
Kyle Langvardt has noted that “[o]ne would expect that all government religious
speech would survive under a coercion approach.”182 The plaintiffs’ decision to rely
on a coercion argument therefore seems curious.
Perhaps Galloway and Stephens simply (and reasonably) believed they
possessed a stronger argument for government coercion than the arguments that
had prevailed in Lee and Santa Fe.183 However, Becket Fund advocate Eric
Rassbach argued that the plaintiffs were trying to rescue “the ailing endorsement

the gateway to citizen participation in the affairs of local government. To have them do so
runs afoul of the promise of public neutrality among faiths that resides at the heart of the
First Amendment’s religion clauses.”).
173. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000).
174. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1827 (2014) (plurality opinion).
175. Id. at 1826.
176. Id. at 1827 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 597) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
178. See Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1853 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (listing numerous
references to Christian dogma in the town’s prayers).
179. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
180. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
181. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), abrogated on other
grounds by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
182. Kyle Langvardt, The Lawless Rule of the Norm in the Government Religious Speech
Cases, 20 WASH. & LEE. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 405, 443 (2014).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 157–60.
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test.”184 According to this theory, the plaintiffs avoided making an endorsement
argument before the Supreme Court so that the Court would not have an opportunity
to overrule the endorsement test.185 If that was their intention, they succeeded.186
Although Rassbach acknowledged that “the courts of appeals almost uniformly
[rely] on Lemon/endorsement as the main way to decide Establishment Clause
cases,”187 he contended that endorsement has fallen out of favor with the Supreme
Court.188 Professor Ian Bartrum offered a similar interpretation, speculating that the
Court agreed to hear the case because “some Justices [saw] an opportunity to
reconsider the so-called endorsement test that now governs many Establishment
Clause questions.”189 Additionally, scholars have argued for several years that the
coercion test is gaining traction as an analytical framework in Establishment Clause
cases.190 Galloway’s ultimate legacy may be its role in the struggle between the
endorsement and coercion tests.
2. Galloway’s Impact
While it would be premature to make any sweeping statements about the
long-term effects of the Galloway decision, there are a few safe conclusions. First,
the Supreme Court will likely not revisit the issue of legislative prayer for a number
of years, if ever. More than thirty years passed between the Court’s decisions in
Marsh and Galloway. And the Court stated that, “[a]bsent a pattern of prayers that
over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose, a
challenge based solely on the content of a prayer will not likely establish a
constitutional violation,”191 which suggests the Court is getting out of the
legislative prayer adjudication business.
Second, the Justices who favor the coercion test will attempt to extend Galloway to
Establishment Clause cases that do not involve legislative prayer. Less than two
months after the Galloway decision, the Court denied certiorari in a case where the
Seventh Circuit had applied the endorsement test and declared that a school’s decision
to hold its graduation ceremony in a Christian church violated the Establishment

184. Eric Rassbach, Symposium: Lemon Wins a Reprieve, but the End Is Near,
SCOTUSBLOG (May 6, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/symposium
-lemon-wins-a-reprieve-but-the-end-is-near/.
185. See id.
186. See id. (“The attorneys for the plaintiffs are thus to be congratulated for clever
lawyering.”).
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Ian Bartrum, The Curious Case of Legislative Prayer: Town of Greece v. Galloway,
108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 218, 219 (2014).
190. See, e.g., Antony Barone Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s Neighborhood”: A Home for
Minority Religions?, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 819, 833 (2007) (“Conventional wisdom
assumes that the most likely Lemon replacement under the new majority will be the
‘coercion’ test, which sees the purpose of the Establishment Clause as the protection of an
individual’s religious liberty by preventing religious coercion.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); accord Paulsen, supra note 37, at 826 n.115 (“[T]he historical evidence
overwhelmingly supports the coercion test.”).
191. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014).
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Clause.192 Justice Scalia dissented from the denial of certiorari and argued that “Town
of Greece abandoned the antiquated ‘endorsement test,’ which formed the basis for the
decision below.”193 Although Galloway did not apply the endorsement test—possibly
because Galloway and Stephens’s argument did not rely on it194—it would be a rather
large stretch to suggest that it abandoned the endorsement test for all time, in all
circumstances. If the Justices in the Galloway majority make a concerted effort to
expand and distort the decision beyond its true holding, Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky’s fear that “the Roberts Court is eroding the notion of a wall separating
church and state and allowing much more religious involvement in government and
government support for religion”195 may prove to be well-founded.
Third, the circuit courts will not immediately change their approach to all
Establishment Clause cases because of the Galloway decision. Although the
Supreme Court overruled the Second Circuit in Galloway, the Second Circuit has
not changed its approach to Establishment Clause cases that do not involve
legislative prayer. In Newdow v. Peterson,196 a post-Galloway case that involved an
Establishment Clause challenge to the use of the phrase “In God We Trust” on
currency,197 the Second Circuit applied the Lemon test and noted that “Lemon
remains the prevailing test in this Circuit, absent its abrogation.”198 And in
American Atheists, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,199 another
post-Galloway case, the Second Circuit applied the Lemon and endorsement tests200
to an Establishment Clause challenge regarding the display at the National September
11 Memorial and Museum of a steel cross recovered from the World Trade Center.201
Thus it appears that, at least in the Second Circuit, Galloway is viewed as a decision
on legislative prayer alone, not on the Establishment Clause as a whole.
D. A Question of Purpose
When evaluating these questions—whether Marsh and Galloway were correctly
decided and whether endorsement or coercion is the proper Establishment Clause
test—it helps to think about purpose. What is the purpose of legislative prayer and,
more broadly, what is the purpose of the Establishment Clause?

192. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 134 S. Ct. 2283, 2284 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
193. Id.
194. See supra Part III.C.1.
195. Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: Dismantling the Wall That Should Separate
Church and State, SCOTUSBLOG (May 6, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014
/05/symposium-dismantling-the-wall-that-should-separate-church-and-state/.
196. 753 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014).
197. Id. at 106.
198. Id. at 107.
199. 760 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2014).
200. Id. at 242 (“The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the principal or
primary effect of the challenged government action neither advance nor inhibit religion. This
mandate is often cast in terms of endorsement . . . .” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
201. Id. at 233.
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Courts and commentators alike have struggled to pin down the purpose of
legislative prayer. Justice O’Connor famously wrote that governmental
acknowledgments of religion such as legislative prayer “serve, in the only ways
reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing
public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the
recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”202 Professor Lund argued
that the purpose “is to foster an inclusive legislative atmosphere.”203
Justice Kennedy himself proposed several different (sometimes contradictory)
theories about the purposes of legislative prayer in his Galloway opinion. First, he
asserted that the prayers were “intended to place town board members in a solemn
and deliberative frame of mind, invoke divine guidance in town affairs, and follow
a tradition practiced by Congress and dozens of state legislatures.”204 He also
claimed that legislative prayer “lends gravity to public business, reminds
lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher purpose, and
expresses a common aspiration to a just and peaceful society,”205 and that it
“reflect[s] values long part of the Nation’s heritage.”206 He argued that the
lawmakers themselves were the principal audience for the prayers,207 and that the
purpose was to “accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers and connect them
to a tradition dating to the time of the Framers.”208 Yet he also claimed that the
purpose was to “acknowledge the place religion holds in the lives of many private
citizens,”209 and to acknowledge “the central place that religion, and religious
institutions, hold in the lives of those present.”210 Justice Kagan put it more bluntly,
noting that the prayers were “directed squarely at the citizens,”211 and that “the
chaplain leads, as the first part of a town meeting, a highly intimate (albeit
relatively brief) prayer service, with the public serving as his congregation.”212
All of the secular purposes listed above—solemnizing the occasion, fostering an
inclusive atmosphere, putting legislators in a deliberative frame of mind, etc.—
could be accomplished easily by something other than prayer.213 Justice
O’Connor’s claim that legislative prayer is one of “the only ways reasonably
possible in our culture”214 to accomplish these objectives is plainly wrong. Whether

202. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); accord
Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 288 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The
avowed purpose of the invocation is simply that of a brief pronouncement of simple values
presumably intended to solemnize the occasion. The invocation is not intended for the
exchange of views or other public discourse. Nor is it intended for the exercise of one’s
religion.” (citation omitted)).
203. Lund, supra note 76, at 1018.
204. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816 (2014).
205. Id. at 1818.
206. Id. at 1823.
207. Id. at 1825 (plurality opinion).
208. Id. at 1826.
209. Id. at 1825.
210. Id. at 1827.
211. Id. at 1848 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
212. Id.
213. See infra Part IV.D.
214. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

430

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:407

the government may constitutionally engage in the more religious purposes listed
above, such as accommodating the spiritual needs of legislators, depends on one’s
interpretation of the purpose of the Establishment Clause.
This question ultimately lies at the heart of legislative prayer cases and the debate
between the endorsement and coercion tests. The endorsement test, which prohibits
the government from endorsing or disapproving of religion,215 is grounded in the
neutrality principle. As Justice Douglas once wrote, “The First Amendment teaches
that a government neutral in the field of religion better serves all religious
interests.”216 The coercion test, meanwhile, is more compatible with Justice Scalia’s
philosophy that “there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion
generally, honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a
nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.”217 Under the most
literal interpretation of the test, the Establishment Clause would prohibit only
coercion “by force of law and threat of penalty.”218
The problem with Justice Scalia’s view, and with the coercion test in general, is
that it would not even prohibit an official establishment of a state religion. As Justice
Stevens put it, “A Clause so interpreted would not prohibit explicit state
endorsements of religious orthodoxies of particular sects, actions that lie at the heart
of what the Clause was meant to regulate. The government could, for example, take
out television advertisements lauding Catholicism as the only pure religion.”219
Therefore, the coercion test cannot be the correct analytical framework for
Establishment Clause cases. The endorsement test, which is faithful to the
longstanding neutrality principle220 and the purposes of the First Amendment, is the
far superior option. Because all legislative prayers endorse religion over
nonreligion, the practice is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court wrongly decided
both Marsh and Galloway, and these decisions should be overruled.
IV. THE RISING NONE AND THE FALL OF LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
JUSTICE SCALIA: You want to pick the groups we’re going to exclude?
MR. [DOUGLAS] LAYCOCK: I think you picked them, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SCALIA: The Baha’i, who else? These—these groups are too small
to—
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We’ve already excluded the atheists, right?
JUSTICE SCALIA: Yeah, the atheists are out already.221

Two separate but related causes help explain the Supreme Court’s deviation
from the neutrality principle in legislative prayer cases. First, the strategic model of

215. See id. at 690.
216. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
217. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
218. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
219. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 733 n.35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).
221. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 167, at 45–46 (questioning Douglas
Laycock, attorney for Respondents Galloway and Stephens, about which groups would be
excluded from even a supposedly nonsectarian legislative prayer practice).
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judicial decision making demonstrates that institutional pressures on the Court
influence its decisions. Because legislative prayer receives such strong support
from other governmental institutions and the general public, there is a great amount
of pressure on the Court to uphold the practice, even though the Establishment
Clause “mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion.”222 Second, these cases evince a longstanding
governmental disregard for religious minorities, such as polytheists and atheists,
who believe in anything other than a monotheistic God. This final Part will
examine both of these causes in turn, and will explain how shifting religious
attitudes in America and the increasing number of Nones—those who do not
identify with any particular religion—will ultimately lead to the elimination of
legislative prayer. Finally, a few alternatives that could replace legislative prayer
will be proposed.
A. Institutional Pressures
As previously noted, Justice Scalia has suggested that the Court’s interest in
self-preservation leads it to occasionally ignore the neutrality principle.223 The
strategic model explains why the Court would be concerned with self-preservation
in the first place. In a nutshell, this model supposes that judges understand that
“they are constrained in their powers by the operation of outsiders, which may
include the Congress, the President, the general public, state governments, private
interest groups, attorneys, litigants, or other entities,” and suggests that “judges
amend their decisions to account for the preferences of these other actors.”224 In
applying this model, Professors Frank B. Cross and Blake J. Nelson addressed
“first stage institutionalism” (the possibility that the Court’s decisions could be
overruled by congressional legislation) and “second stage institutionalism” (a
variety of other institutional constraints on the Court).225 Cross and Nelson
concluded that the second stage institutional concerns have a greater impact on the
courts.226 This is especially true for constitutional decisions, which are much more
difficult for Congress to override.227

222. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104.
223. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
224. Cross & Nelson, supra note 20, at 1446.
225. Id. at 1450.
226. See id. at 1459–60 (“While statutory reversal is closely targeted to the congressional
concern, the other tools have potentially much more power, as they may strike at the very
independence of the judiciary itself and the powers and resources that judges require or
strongly desire.”).
227. See id. at 1459 (“The override model is limited to statutory decisions, as the
difficulty of constitutional amendment largely precludes an override to constitutional
interpretations of the Court.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Judicial Review Game, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 382, 386 (1993) (“When the Court strikes down a federal statute as
unconstitutional, an override is very difficult, because it must be accomplished by a
constitutional amendment requiring supermajorities in both chambers of Congress and
ratification by three-quarters of the state legislatures.”).
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Some of the second stage institutional constraints wielded by Congress include
“threatened impeachment, jurisdiction restrictions, other legislation limiting court
powers and reducing the courts’ resources.”228 Although Congress lacks the power to
reduce judicial salaries, the legislature can withhold salary increases and resources
such as funding for support staff and courthouses.229 Thus, “Congress may achieve
indirectly through appropriations what it cannot do directly.”230
Additionally, local governments and the people themselves wield some
authority over the courts. If these entities refuse to implement a judicial decision,
“there is little courts can do.”231 In Brown v. Board of Education,232 for example,
the Supreme Court’s decision had little effect in desegregating the South until
President Johnson and Congress took action.233
Finally, the President also has influence over the Court.234 Due to the President’s
role in the legislative process, there is a strong incentive for the Court to agree with
his or her position; “[i]f the President supports the Court over Congress, the
legislature must muster a two-thirds majority to act against the Court.”235
Clearly, these institutional concerns affect legislative prayer cases, and did so
particularly in Galloway. Congress has a vested interest in the Court’s decisions; it
has employed chaplains since 1789,236 and many of its members would like to
continue that practice.237 Due to the widespread acceptance and popularity of
legislative prayer, it is questionable whether the people and local governments
would accept a decision abolishing the practice—at least one chamber in every
state legislature begins its sessions with a prayer.238 And in Galloway, the Obama
Administration urged the Court to uphold the town’s legislative prayer practice.239
This position was somewhat surprising, considering President Obama’s history
with religious issues. While running for President in 2008, he famously criticized
rural Pennsylvanians for “clinging to religion.”240 Perhaps the President succumbed

228. Cross & Nelson, supra note 20, at 1460.
229. Id. at 1465–66.
230. Id. at 1469.
231. Id. at 1470 (quoting GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 19 (1991))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
232. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
233. Cross & Nelson, supra note 20, at 1471.
234. Id. at 1472.
235. Id.
236. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).
237. See generally Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL
4011043 (arguing on behalf of eighty-five members of Congress that the Supreme Court
should rule in favor of the Town of Greece).
238. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 169, at 54.
239. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 3990880.
240. Mayhill Fowler, Obama: No Surprise That Hard-Pressed Pennsylvanians Turn Bitter,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2008, 10:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mayhill
-fowler/obama-no-surprise-that-ha_b_96188.html.
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to institutional pressures of his own and sought to take a position that would help
his image among religious constituents and members of Congress.241
Furthermore, the Justices themselves have provided evidence that they respond
to these institutional pressures when deciding Establishment Clause cases. In
Marsh, Justice Brennan speculated that striking down Nebraska’s prayer practice
would have “stimulated a furious reaction.”242 During oral arguments in Galloway,
Justice Kagan expressed concern that invalidating the town’s prayer practice would
“make the problem worse rather than better.”243 And in Van Orden v. Perry,244 a
case concerning a Ten Commandments monument, Justice Breyer worried that
finding the display of the monument unconstitutional would encourage further
challenges to similar monuments and “thereby create the very kind of religiously
based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”245 This possibility
led him to join Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion upholding the
constitutionality of the monument even though he did not agree with its reasoning.246
These institutional concerns clearly played a role in Galloway. In addition to
Justice Kagan’s comments during oral argument,247 the majority claimed that
abolishing legislative prayer “would create new controversy and begin anew the
very divisions along religious lines that the Establishment Clause seeks to
prevent.”248 Indeed, as a practical matter, it may have been impossible to reach any
other result. Like Marsh before it, Galloway was “politically impossible to affirm
and legally impossible to reverse.”249 Yet if the purpose underlying these decisions
was not only to preserve the Court’s political standing but also to avoid religiously
based divisiveness, then Marsh was a failure. Professor Lund argued that “[a]s long
as legislative prayer is constitutionally permissible—as long as Marsh lives—these
fights over legislative prayer will continue, as will the distress that gives rise to
them.”250 The same can be said for Galloway.

241. It is also possible that the Obama Administration took this position because it feared
the Supreme Court would overrule the endorsement test. See Bartrum, supra note 189, at 226
(arguing that the Solicitor General “entered the case in order to give the Court another
option—preserve the endorsement test, but conclude that most sectarian legislative prayers
are permissible as a historically entrenched exception”); cf. Rassbach, supra note 184
(arguing that Galloway and Stephens made a similar effort to preserve the endorsement test
by relying on the coercion test instead).
242. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 822 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 167, at 52.
244. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
245. Id. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
246. William Van Alstyne, Ten Commandments, Nine Judges, and Five Versions of One
Amendment—The First. (“Now What?”), 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 17, 25 (2005).
247. See supra text accompanying note 243.
248. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014).
249. See Lund, supra note 76, at 984 (quoting Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships,
the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the
Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 115, 224 (2004)) (referring to Marsh).
250. Lund, supra note 76, at 979.
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B. The Supreme Court’s Preference for Monotheism
The widespread support for legislative prayer, and therefore the institutional
pressures that drive the outcomes of legislative prayer cases, can be partially
explained by the government’s longstanding attitude toward religious minorities. In
Establishment Clause cases, the government has traditionally shown little concern
for them. As Justice Scalia argued in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Ky.251:
One cannot say the word “God,” or “the Almighty,” one cannot offer
public supplication or thanksgiving, without contradicting the beliefs of
some people that there are many gods, or that God or the gods pay no
attention to human affairs. With respect to public acknowledgment of
religious belief, it is entirely clear from our Nation’s historical practices
that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and
believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of
devout atheists.252
This helps explain why the Marsh Court found nothing objectionable about prayers
delivered exclusively in “the Judeo-Christian tradition,”253 even though that
tradition does not include the members of many other religious groups. It also
explains the result in Simpson, where the Fourth Circuit held that Chesterfield
County’s prayer practice was sufficiently inclusive because it was “wide enough
. . . to include Islam,”254 despite the plaintiff’s exclusion from the prayer practice
solely because of her unconventional religious beliefs.255
Justice Scalia’s disregard of religious minorities was on full display in the
portion of the oral arguments in Galloway excerpted at the beginning of this Part, in
which he and Chief Justice Roberts cavalierly bantered about which religious
groups would be excluded from a hypothetical nonsectarian prayer policy.256 It
seems that atheists and the Baha’i are among the only religious minority groups that
government officials may still comfortably and openly discriminate against. Such
discrimination occurs because the public accepts it. Indeed, some writers have agreed
with Justice Scalia’s reading of the Establishment Clause.257 Attorney Antony Barone
Kolenc supported this interpretation because “historically, public acknowledgments
of religion by all three branches of both state and federal government have been in the
monotheistic context.”258 In other words, history and the majority rule.

251. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
252. Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983).
254. Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 286 (4th Cir. 2005).
255. See id. at 280 (“Chesterfield’s non-sectarian invocations are traditionally made to a
divinity that is consistent with the Judeo-Christian tradition, a divinity that would not be
invoked by practitioners of witchcraft.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
256. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., Kolenc, supra note 190.
258. Id. at 877.
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Others have rejected this “majority rules” vision of religious liberty. Professor
Thomas B. Colby sharply criticized Justice Scalia’s McCreary dissent, asserting
that Scalia believes
the Establishment Clause permits the government to favor religion over
nonreligion (but not vice versa), and, in the context of governmental
religious expression, to favor Judeo-Christian monotheism over all
other religions (but not vice versa). In other words, in Justice Scalia’s
opinion, biblical monotheism is now, has always been, and always will
be, the favored religion of the United States Constitution.259
This position contradicts “the view that the government cannot ‘constitutionally
pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers,
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs.’”260 Lund also expressed
concerns about bowing to the will of the majority on religious matters: “Legislative
prayer is often framed as pitting nonbelievers against believers, but that is an
oversimplification. Having legislative prayer means committing religious decisions
to a majoritarian governmental process, which has deep ramifications for all
religious minorities.”261
Colby’s and Lund’s views are more in line with the Supreme Court’s decisions
holding that the Religion Clauses guarantee “religious liberty and equality to the
infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or
Judaism”;262 that the government must be neutral between religion and
nonreligion;263 that “one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another”;264 and that the First Amendment “erected a wall between church and
state.”265 These holdings have led scholars to the conclusion that “[t]he government
simply shouldn’t be in the business of endorsing the belief that there is a God, even
a generic one,”266 and that the government’s proper approach to religious belief is
agnosticism: “Agnostics have no opinion for epistemological reasons; the
government must have no opinion for constitutional reasons. The government must
have no opinion because it is not the government’s role to have an opinion.”267
Ultimately, shifting religious beliefs in America and the increasing importance of
the Nones dictate that this latter view will prevail.

259. Colby, supra note 55, at 1098.
260. Id. at 1113 (quoting Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961)).
261. Lund, supra note 42, at 1176.
262. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989)
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted),
abrogated on other grounds by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
263. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
264. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
265. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
266. Segall, supra note 83, at 730.
267. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313,
356 (1996).
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C. The Rising None
An abundance of recent data indicates that the number of Americans who have
no religious affiliation is growing. In a 2013 survey, 20% of respondents indicated
that they had no religious preference.268 Only 8% reported no religious preference
in 1990.269 The American Religious Identification Survey found that the percentage
of Nones had increased from 8.2% in 1990 to 15% in 2008,270 and the Nones had
the largest percentage share of population growth during that time period.271
Similarly, the 2008 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey found that 16.1% of
American adults were unaffiliated with any particular faith,272 and this group was
“the biggest gainer in this religious competition.”273 People moving into the
category outnumbered those moving out of it by a margin of more than
three-to-one.274 Note that the Nones are more than just atheists and agnostics; the
category also typically includes those who are unaffiliated with a particular
religion, whether they describe themselves as religious or secular.275
In fact, the percentage of atheists in America has only increased slightly over
recent decades. In 2012, just 3% of Americans identified themselves as atheists.276
This represented an increase from 1% in 1965 and 2% in 1991.277 This modest
increase in the percentage of atheists led the Institute for the Study of Societal
Issues to conclude that religious belief is not declining.278 However, the Institute’s
own data seem to undermine this conclusion. The percentages of atheists,
agnostics, and those who do not believe in a personal God but believe in a “Higher
Power” all increased from 1991 through 2012; meanwhile, the percentages of those
who believe in God some of the time, who believe in God but have doubts, and
who believe in God without a doubt all decreased over the same time period.279 In
any case, these sources agree that the percentage of Nones has increased
dramatically since the early 1990s, indicating that the American population is
becoming more secular and less attached to particular religious affiliations.

268. Anwar, supra note 19.
269. Id.
270. BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION
SURVEY SUMMARY REPORT 3 (2009), available at http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/2011
/08/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf.
271. Id. at 4.
272. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5 (2008),
available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
273. Id. at 7.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 6.
276. MICHAEL HOUT, CLAUDE S. FISCHER & MARK A. CHAVES, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY,
INST. FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETAL ISSUES, MORE AMERICANS HAVE NO RELIGIOUS
PREFERENCE: KEY FINDING FROM THE 2012 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY 4 (2013), available at
http://issi.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/docs/Hout%20et%20al
_No%20Relig%20Pref%202012_Release%20Mar%202013.pdf.
277. Id. at 6.
278. Id. at 4.
279. See id. at 12.
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One final statistical observation deserves mention: the ascendance of the Nones
is primarily a youth movement. Gallup Daily tracking information for the year
2012 found that 27% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 had no religious
affiliation, compared to 19% for ages 30–49, 14% for ages 50–64, and 10% for
ages 65 and older.280 Although these numbers could be explained by a theory that
people become more religious as they grow older, the Institute for the Study of
Societal Issues rejected that hypothesis: “We suspect that these age differences will
not diminish as the people in them age. Instead we see them as persisting
generational differences that are likely to characterize these collections of people
throughout their life course . . . .”281
D. The Fall of Legislative Prayer
What does this all mean for legislative prayer? These religious trends will likely
continue in the future. Considering the generational data quoted in Part IV.C, it
appears likely that each succeeding generation of new Americans will be less
religious than the one before it.282 Additionally, while the nation was more than 98%
Christian at the time of the founding,283 it was only 78.4% Christian in 2008.284 Even
if America is still a “Christian nation de facto,”285 it is less Christian than it was two
centuries ago—and it will likely be even less Christian in the future.
For legislative prayer to be abolished, it is not necessary that the Nones
eventually become the majority (or that Christians become a minority). Minorities
have achieved civil rights victories before the Supreme Court without ever
becoming a majority of the population.286 What matters is that a significant portion
of the public—and, therefore, the people’s elected representatives—become
sympathetic to the cause.
As time passes and Americans become more secular and less attached to
religion, they will likely also grow less tolerant of the Court’s preference for
monotheistic religions—and Christianity in particular—over all others. Such a shift
would remove the institutional pressures that have forced the Court to uphold
legislative prayer until now. The will of the people would trickle down to Congress
and the Presidency, removing the pressures imposed by the legislative and
executive branches. At that time, the Court would be free to strike down legislative
prayer and bring this area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence into line with the
Constitution’s promise of religious neutrality for all.

280. Lydia Saad, In U.S., Rise in Religious “Nones” Slows in 2012, GALLUP (Jan. 10,
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281. HOUT ET AL., supra note 276, at 3.
282. See KOSMIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 22 (“In the future we can expect more
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283. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 167, at 44.
284. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 272, at 5.
285. Fourth Circuit Holds, supra note 108, at 1230.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (ruling that the
Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of marriage as only between a man and a woman
violated the Fifth Amendment rights of same-sex couples).
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This sea change did not arrive in time to benefit Galloway and Stephens, but the
cracks in legislative prayer’s armor have already begun to show. The Hawaii
Senate recently became the first state legislative body to ban legislative prayer.287
According to Brett Harvey and Joel Oster, “seventeen federal lawsuits have
challenged the validity of various legislative prayer practices” between 2004 and
2013.288 Clearly, a significant number of people are not satisfied with the legislative
prayer status quo, and the rise of the Nones suggests that number is growing.
After the inevitable fall of legislative prayer, what standard will rise to take its
place? It would be unnecessary for the Court to craft a new rule. It could simply
overrule Marsh and Galloway and revive the Lemon/endorsement test as the
prevailing standard in legislative prayer cases. As Justice Brennan noted in Marsh,
any legislative prayer policy must flunk the Lemon test.289 Legislative prayer does
not have a primarily secular purpose, its primary effect is to advance and endorse
religion, and it fosters an excessive entanglement with religion.290
If government entities are determined to begin legislative sessions with a ceremony
that serves “the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions,
expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy
of appreciation in society,”291 there are several ways they may do so without using
prayer. As Justice Kennedy rightly noted in Allegheny, “appeals to patriotism,
moments of silence, and any number of other approaches would be as effective.”292
Appeals to patriotism may be the closest substitute for legislative prayer. A
legislative body could read from the writings of the Founding Fathers, the
Declaration of Independence, or any number of presidential speeches throughout
history. In fact, two months after the Galloway decision, a man named Dan
Courtney delivered the first atheist invocation before a Greece town board
meeting.293 Mr. Courtney “quoted the Declaration of Independence and called upon
common principals [sic] that unite all Americans.”294 Such invocations, if delivered
at every meeting, would provide all the secular and civic benefits of legislative
prayer with none of the controversy or religiously based divisiveness.
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Alternatively, Professor Eric J. Segall has advocated using moments of
silence.295 This would provide an opportunity for prayer, but those who do not wish
to take part would not be “compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of
others.”296 Moments of silence would certainly eliminate the problems associated
with spoken legislative prayers, but they would not provide the same civic benefits
as appeals to patriotism.
Finally, a government entity could establish a public forum in which citizens
would be completely free to express their religious views, as the town claimed that it
did in Galloway.297 However, this would require the government to “give up virtually
all control over the resulting speech. . . . It will have to allow entirely secular
invocations. It will have to allow speeches that question the appropriateness of
legislative prayer, and speeches that reject prayer altogether.”298 Thus, a legislative
body would more likely choose patriotic ceremonies or moments of silence.
Other secular, constitutional alternatives could undoubtedly be imagined. As the
preceding discussion demonstrates, the secular purposes served by legislative prayer
never required an actual prayer. The practice was never justified by necessity or any
legitimate constitutional principle; its only justification was the questionable
historical tradition relied upon by the Supreme Court in Marsh and Galloway.
CONCLUSION
Legislative prayer was unconstitutional when the First Congress implemented
the practice, when Marsh affirmed it in 1983, and when Galloway reaffirmed it in
2014. Its continued existence has provided no public benefit that could not have
been obtained through secular means, and it has created religious strife,
divisiveness, and controversy, leading to litigation in Galloway and many other
cases. The institutional pressures on the Court dictated that legislative prayer could
not be struck down in Galloway or in the immediate future. But eventually, assuming
the Nones continue to grow and America continues its slow shift from the religious to
the secular, legislative prayer will likely be abolished. Until that day arrives, we can
expect only additional controversy and further litigation in this area of the law.
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